Compliance Assessment

Why Physical Security Is a Cyber Problem

Table of Contents

Why Physical Security Is a Cyber Problem

An adversary walks through the front door of a commercial office. They’re dressed for the environment, carrying the right equipment, moving with the unhurried confidence of someone who is supposed to be there, and make their way past the entrance foyer without being questioned. Within an hour, they’ve accessed the server room, photographed sensitive operational documents, and placed a device on the internal network that will sit there undetected for weeks.

The organisation had mature endpoint detection and a SIEM. Their technical controls were regularly assessed and, by most external measures, their security programme was in good shape. But when access is gained through the physical environment, the relevance of those investments changes entirely.

The Gap That Lives Between Two Teams

Many organisations manage cyber and physical security as separate disciplines, with different teams, different budgets, and different risk registers. On the surface that makes organisational sense. One team watches dashboards and alerts, the other manages access cards and CCTV. The problem is that adversaries don’t recognise that division.

If someone can breach the perimeter of a facility, a significant portion of technical controls become irrelevant. Endpoint detection doesn’t fire when someone walks down a corridor, and other technical defences rarely have anything to say about a door opened with a cloned access card. The tools organisations invest heavily in are rendered secondary by a gap that lives not in a firewall ruleset, but maybe in a door frame, a guard rotation schedule, or a visitor sign-in process that hasn’t been reviewed in several years.

Physical security isn’t simply locks, access cards, and cameras. It covers people, processes, information, technology, and infrastructure, with the most significant vulnerabilities sitting at the point where those elements overlap. That’s exactly where a focused adversary will look first.

What Happens Before Anyone Arrives

What takes time is the preparation. The intrusion itself can often be over far sooner than organisations would expect.

Before Sekuro’s physical security team gets near a building, a detailed intelligence picture has already been built from publicly available information. Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) gathering is not a capability exclusive to nation-state actors. It is a straightforward, methodical process and, for many organisations, sobering in what it returns.

The digital footprint of many organisations is significantly larger than security teams realise. Across engagements, OSINT collection has surfaced the location of key safes, networked devices, secure area layouts, and on multiple occasions, passwords. Social media platforms such as LinkedIn provide a detailed map of an organisation’s people, their roles, departments, and reporting lines, and in the context of a physical engagement, reveals who carries what level of access and who is worth targeting because of it. Corporate event photos, staff-produced content on social media, and coverage from open days and company events each appear innocuous individually, but assembled together they produce an operational picture that is far more actionable than most organisations would be comfortable with.

Applied to a real target, it tends to look something like this. Take a security-conscious commercial organisation with a dedicated cyber security team, mature endpoint detection, and a network perimeter that is regularly tested. By conventional measures, their security posture is strong.

Building floor plans are available through a simple search. In the background of publicly available material, details of a recent office renovation have surfaced online, including images detailing the door hardware and access control technologies installed throughout the facility. A local news article from twelve months prior features a photograph taken inside the office, with staff ID badges clearly readable. Several employees have posted workplace content on social media showing internal areas, technologies in use, and enough environmental detail to start mapping entry points and access flows.

No exploit was required, no systems were touched, and the information was simply sitting there waiting to be pieced together by anyone with the motivation to look.

Physical reconnaissance follows. This can involve aerial observation using drones, static positions with line of sight to the target, vehicle-based surveillance, and on-foot techniques ranging from long-range surveillance to close-target reconnaissance. For an adversary, the objective of this phase is pattern-of-life analysis, covering guard patrol schedules, cleaning rotations, delivery windows, shift changeovers, and the informal daily routines that staff may not think of as security-relevant, that almost never appear on a risk register.

By the time the team arrives on site, they know which entrance offers the path of least resistance, which staff operate in specific areas of the building, and exactly what a legitimate visitor looks like. In many cases, the reconnaissance phase compresses the on-site time required to achieve objectives down to a window that can make detection increasingly unlikely.

Moving In

Most of what happens on the day of an intrusion would look entirely unremarkable to an observer, even when it isn’t.

There is no fixed script. The entry approach might exploit gaps in visitor management processes, leverage social engineering techniques, or rely on cloned credentials to move through access-controlled areas. Access cards using legacy card technologies are still widespread across commercial and industrial facilities globally and can be cloned with inexpensive, readily available hardware in a matter of seconds, without the cardholder noticing anything. And where the environment presents the opportunity, tailgating is a consistently underestimated access vector that can remain difficult to counter in some facilities through technology alone.

Back to the scenario, everything about the approach has been calibrated against weeks of intelligence gathering, and the team moves accordingly.

Inside, the team locates the key safe, accesses restricted areas within the engagement’s scope, photographs sensitive operational documentation, and places a device on the internal network, one that masquerades as a legitimate network asset and generates no alerts on the security team’s tooling.

Returning after hours with the cloned access card allows a more thorough examination of the facility, from door frames that yield to basic bypass techniques, to inadequate out-of-hours monitoring, unsecured document storage, and physical media left accessible overnight. Even without placing a device, physical documents containing PII and intellectual property could have been removed. This is where the distinction between technical and physical security becomes academic.

The Insider Problem

There’s a dimension to physical security risk that rarely gets enough attention, and it concerns the people who already have the keys. Whether motivated by financial gain, coercion, or grievance, malicious insiders are among the hardest threat actors to defend against, precisely because their access is authorised.

The question isn’t only whether your controls can stop someone from getting in. It’s what a trusted employee, contractor, or third party with site access could do once they’re already there. What do their credentials give them access to? Which areas, systems, or information assets sit within reach of an authorised access card or physical key?

These are uncomfortable questions. They’re also the right ones to be asking.

The Risk Isn’t Sector-Specific

There’s a common assumption that physical security assessments belong to critical infrastructure operators, financial institutions, and organisations that have already encountered a physical incident. In practice, that assumption underestimates both the scope of the risk and the range of organisations it affects.

Sekuro’s physical security team works across a wide range of sectors including Operational Technology (OT) environments, healthcare, logistics, education, retail, professional sport, and government. Targets vary widely, from distribution centres and medical facilities through to power substations, but the underlying vulnerability pattern holds consistently across many of them. Where physical and cyber security are treated as separate concerns, gaps emerge that can facilitate theft, data exfiltration, malware deployment, and operational disruption.

The bottom line is that the size of an organisation doesn’t always determine the value of what’s inside it, or how motivated an adversary might be to obtain access.

What Strong Outcomes Look Like

The purpose of a physical security assessment isn’t to embarrass an organisation. It’s to surface what is genuinely difficult to see from the inside.

The findings from these engagements tend to have a broad reach. Sanitised scenarios and documented findings have been used directly in employee security awareness programmes, converting a single engagement into an ongoing internal training resource. OSINT reviews have led to the removal of sensitive information from public sources before it could be exploited. Access control systems have been upgraded, legacy card technologies replaced, door hardware strengthened, and network port security hardened. Surveillance systems have been reconfigured, not always replaced wholesale, but optimised based on documented blind spots and alerting gaps that were observed and actively exploited during assessments.

And back to cyber, several engagements have uncovered internal network vulnerabilities that had not been previously identified, leading to meaningful improvements in network segmentation and lateral movement defences. In a number of cases, a physical assessment found what years of technical testing had not.

Where This Leaves You

If your organisation has a strong cyber security programme but the physical environment hasn’t had the same level of scrutiny applied to it, that’s a gap worth addressing. An adversary who can’t get through your firewall, may look for a way to stand in front of it instead.

Sekuro’s physical security team works with global organisations to assess and strengthen their cyber-physical security postures. If you’d like to understand how yours holds up, we’d welcome the conversation.

Craig Dutton

Craig Dutton

Managing Consultant, Offensive Security

Craig is Managing Consultant, Offensive Security at Sekuro, specialising in penetration testing, red teaming and physical security assessments. Before moving into consulting, he spent nine years with the UK Ministry of Defence as a Cyber and Electromagnetic Activity (CEMA) Specialist. Craig holds industry certifications including OSCP, CRTO, CREST Registered Penetration Tester (CRT) and PNPT, and focuses on emulating real world attackers to help organisations strengthen their defences.

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